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Abstract
Language-based security approaches to access control and information ﬂow control must at some point rely
on a language for expressing policies. However there will in general be several choices for the correct policy
language for any given application, and several choices for the implementation of a policy language in a
given domain. This article considers an approach to implementing the policy language at the application
level, relying on trusted cryptographic libraries whose interface security guarantees are used to verify the
correctness of the policy language implementation.
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1 Introduction
Many software applications run over untrusted networks. Programmers use libraries
of cryptographic operations to secure the communications over these networks. In
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using these libraries, they are implicitly enforcing security policies for the data is
being exchanged. This policy is often unstated, or only stated informally in program
comments. If these security policies are stated in a suitably formal policy language,
then adherence to these policies may be veriﬁed, often using automatic or semi-
automatic techniques.
One particular approach, exempliﬁed by language-based security, is to express
the policies in a policy language that is incorporated into the type system. Type-
checking then provides an avenue for checking the correct manipulation of data ac-
cording to the security policies expressed in program types. These security policies
can then be related to the cryptographic libraries used to secure network commu-
nications, via typed APIs for cryptographic operations that express the security
guarantees these operations are intended to enforce (e.g., encryption for secrecy,
digital signing for integrity).
An obvious issue that needs to be addressed is the form of the policy language
that is used in the type system to express security policies. The problem is that
any policy language will inevitably (and in fact fairly quickly) run into applications
for which is it inadequate. For example, the JIF language [26,25,28] incorporates a
policy language based on sets of access control lists (ACLs), augmented with a form
of delegation of principal rights. An obvious extension to consider for the JIF policy
language is some form of role-based access control (RBAC), including some notion
of delegation of role-based rights [7]. But even if one just considers the extension
with role-based access control, there are many variations on RBAC that could be
added. The RT family of languages by Li et al [22,23] is a good candidate for such
a policy language, since it appears to be the closest to a “universal” language for
distributed RBAC (i.e., with delegation). But there are numerous variations in
the RT family, and presumably more variations still to be proposed. Furthermore
there are new policy languages being constantly proposed that go beyond RBAC
and delegation, such as policy languages where principals share control of access to
resources.
Rather than committing to a single policy language for all applications, an “end-
to-end” approach would allow individual applications to deﬁne their own policy
languages, or to choose from a library of possible policy languages. Rather than
committing to a particular policy language in the type system, instead arbitrary
policy languages could be loaded, as abstract data types, on a per-application ba-
sis. This approach has been used successfully in the past, in several applications:
logical frameworks for theorem-proving environments [21,32], certiﬁed compilation
environments and proof-carrying code [4,36,4,12], and proof-carrying authentication
[3,5].
In this article we consider an approach that relates application-deﬁned pol-
icy languages to application-deﬁned network security using cryptographic libraries.
This approach combines two avenues of study:
(i) Type-based cryptographic operations that used typed APIs to relate the oper-
ations to the security properties they are intended to enforce across networks.
(ii) Frameworks for deﬁning languages and logics, particularly the approach of
T. Chothia et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 3–214
K ∈ Kind ::= Type | Prop | Prin | k | K1 ⇒ K2
T, P, F ∈ Type, Prin, Prop ::= t | tc | T1 → T2 | ∀t : K.T | (T1 T2) | P says F | rep F
e ∈ Exp ::= x, y, z | a, b, c | λx : T.e | (e1 e2) | Λt : K.e | (e T ) |
case e of c(t, x) ⇒ e
Fig. 1. Syntax of Minilanguage
Th ∈ Theory Signature ::= ({k}, {t : K ⇒ Prop}, {c : Tc}, {c : ∀t : K.T → rep F},CE)
CE ∈ Constants Env ::= ({t : K}, {c : ∀t : K.T → rep P})
D ∈ Datatype ::= datatype tc : K ⇒ Type with c : ∀t : Kc.T→tc(T ′)
TE ∈ Type Env ::= {} | {t : K} | TE1 ∪ TE2
VE ∈ Value Env ::= {} | {x : T} | VE1 ∪VE2
Well-Formed Context Th, D,TE ,VE  context
Kind Formation Th  K
Type Formation Th, D,TE  T : K
Value Formation Th, D,TE ,VE  e : T
Fig. 2. Syntax of Type Judgements
proof-carrying authentication [3,5].
As a major example, we consider a particular policy language implemented as a
library in such a framework. The policy language in question is chosen because it
has two disparate implementations, involving quite diﬀerent sets of cryptographic
operations. This demonstrates the wisdom of moving the implementation of the
policy language out of the language itself and into libraries. Not only does it ap-
pear impractical to expect a single universal policy language that will satisfy the
needs of all applications, but it is also questionable if there is a single universal
implementation of a policy language that matches all applications.
We present a speciﬁcation of the metalanguage as an explicitly typed functional
language, to simplify the presentation. This allows us to give equational spec-
iﬁcations of the semantics of policy languages. We are then able to relate this
treatment of policy language implementation to classic work in the algebraic se-
mantics of abstract data types, ensuring that an implementation is correct with
respect to an equational speciﬁcation [17,20]. “Equational correctness” in this set-
ting means that an authentication operation will extract well-formed “evidence” for
policy statements from digitally signed credentials.
We give a description of the type system in Sect. 2. The policy language im-
plementation example is provided in Sect. 3–Sect. 6. We relate this to type-based
access control and information ﬂow control in Sect. 7. Sect. 8 considers related work
while Sect. 9 provides some conclusions.
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Th, D,TE ,VE  context (x : T ) ∈ VE
Th, D,TE ,VE  x : T (Val Var)
Th, D,TE ,VE ∪ {x : T1}  e : T2
Th, D,TE ,VE  (λx : T1.e) : (T1→T2)
(Val Fun)
Th, D,TE ,VE  e1 : (T2→T1) Th, D,TE ,VE  e2 : T2
Th, D,TE ,VE  (e1 e2) : T1
(Val App)
Th, D,TE ∪ {t : K},VE  e : T
Th, D,TE ,VE  (Λt : K.e) : (∀t : K.T ) (Val TFun)
Th, D,TE ,VE  e : (∀t : K.T ) Th, D,TE  T : K
Th, D,TE ,VE  (e T ) : {T/t}T (Val TApp)
Th, D,TE ,VE  e : (tc T ) Di = (datatype tc : K ⇒ Type with c : ∀t1 : K1.∀t2 : K2.T ′→tc(T ′′))
K = K1 T = {T/t1}T ′′ Th, D,TE ∪ {t2 : K2},VE ∪ {x : {T/t1}T ′}  e′ : T {t2} ∩ ftv(T ) = {}
Th, D,TE ,VE  (case e of c(t2, x) ⇒ e′) : T
(Val Case)
Fig. 3. Type System
(λx : T.e)v −→ {v/x}e (Red Fun)
(Λt : K.e)T −→ {T/t}e (Red TFun)
(case ci(T , v) of c(t, x) ⇒ e) −→ {T/ti, v/xi}ei (Red Case)
e1 −→ e2
E[e1] −→ E[e2]
(Red Cong)
Fig. 4. Evaluation Rules
2 Type System
The syntax of our mini-language is provided in Fig. 1. We use the notation . . .
to denote a sequence, e.g., T denotes the sequence of types T1, . . . , Tn for some n.
The type system comprises a three-level system of values, types and kinds. Kinds
are necessary to check the well-formedness of types, because of the richness of the
latter. The important forms of types are:
(i) Ordinary types are used to check the well-formedness of values. Besides func-
tion and polymorphic types, we include datatypes for basic structuring. These
datatypes go beyond ML datatypes in two signiﬁcant ways: they allow non-
regular recursive type descriptions, and they allow free (implicitly existentially
quantiﬁed) type parameters in the types of data constructors. Both facilities
are critical for examples we have developed.
(ii) Propositions are the basis of application-speciﬁc policy languages. Essentially
access control restrictions are stated in terms of propositions, where the propo-
sitions themselves are formed using predicates. Each predicate is deﬁned in a
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signature for an application-speciﬁc policy language.
Kinds include kind constants k, introduced by signatures for policy languages.
This is because we model security policies at the type level, and therefore need
type-level witnesses for the entities referred to in policies. For example, a policy
language might introduce kind constants for principals and roles, say Prin and Role
respectively. We add a primitive notion of principals for the purposes of the ex-
amples, although as discussed in Sect. 7 there are alternatives for how to represent
principals. To support parameterized types and predicates, we also have a kind
for type operators K1 ⇒ K2. This also allows the representation of for example
parameterized roles.
At the type level, we add a primitive predicate P says F representing access
policy “statements” made by principals. There is an interesting issue of how to
generate such statements in the language. This involves two issues: how to represent
such type-level statements at the value level, and how to ensure the integrity of
such statements. For representation, we add a representation type rep F for the
value-level representation of the type-level proposition F . This also provides a
representation type for value-level representatives of policy-language entities. For
example, if P is a principal (at the type level), rep P is the value representation of
this principal (for example, a principal may be represented at the value level by its
public key).
The value-level language is moderately conventional, aside from the fact that
the case construct disguises the use of existential (locally abstract) types. This is
crucial , for example, in abstracting the identity of intermediate signing principals
in the type of a credential chain. We assume a deﬁned let construct:
(let x : T = e1 in e2) ≡ (λx : T.e2) e1.
An application-speciﬁc policy language is speciﬁed by a theory signature Th.
The policy language speciﬁcation includes:
(i) The declaration of new kind constants (for example, Role for roles).
(ii) The declaration of type-level predicate constants, which should be more prop-
erly considered as constructors for forming statements in a metalanguage rep-
resentation of the policy language.
(iii) The declaration of value-level constructors for the inference rules in the pol-
icy language, the rules that allow new credentials to be derived from existing
credentials.
(iv) The declaration of value-level constructors for representations of the statements
of the policy language. In general a representation of a proposition F has type
rep F .
(v) A constants environment CE for value-level representations of entities that are
modelled in the policy language. This constants environment includes some
collection (possibly inﬁnite) of names {t} for entities modelled at the type
level (for example, names of principals and roles). The constants environment
also includes some collection (possibly inﬁnite) of constructors for value-level
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representations of these entities. In many cases these are simple constants
(for example, public keys identify principals and strings identify roles), but
in some cases structured representations may be necessary (for example, for
parameterized roles). We treat rep as a special type constructor rather than
introduce kind polymorphism, which technically is necessary because the form
of the argument of rep may range over diﬀerent kinds (propositions, principals,
roles, etc).
It is important to understand the diﬀerence between the types F and rep F . The
former denotes the type of a certiﬁcate that veriﬁes that a statement in the policy
language is valid. Such a certiﬁcate is built using the constructors for the inference
rules of the language. The latter denotes the type of a value-level representation
for a policy language statement. It is only checked for its well-formedness, not for
its veracity.
For the purposes of the example in this article, we add a kind Prin for principals,
as well as a proposition form P says F for statements in an arbitrary policy lan-
guage. The rules of a policy language based on this will include rules for combining
certiﬁcates, so that the combination can be checked and the resulting statement
veriﬁed. An interesting question then arises: how to generate primitive policy lan-
guage statements while ensuring their integrity. One approach is to rely on private
signing keys, e.g., an operation of type
PrivateKey(P ) → (rep F ) → P says F.
This is eﬀectively the approach of proof-carrying authentication. We consider an-
other approach, based on type-based access control and information ﬂow control,
in Sect. 7.
The forms of the judgements are provided in Fig. 2 and the type rules are
provided in Fig. 3. The judgements include several contexts:
(i) There is a collection of theory signatures Th.
(ii) There is a collection of datatypes, which for simplicity we assume are declared
globally and mutually recursively with theory signatures.
(iii) There is a type environment mapping type parameters to their kinds.
(iv) There is a value environment mapping variables x, y, z and constants a, b, c
(which may include cryptographic types) to their types.
Deﬁne values in the language by:
v ::= x | c(T , v) | λx : T.e | Λt : K.e
Values include constants and expressions constructed using data constructors. De-
ﬁne evaluation contexts by:
E[ ] ::= [ ] | (E[ ] e) | (v E[ ]) | (E[ ] T )
(case E[ ] of c(t, x) ⇒ e)
The evaluation rules are provided in Fig. 4.
Lemma 2.1 (Subject Reduction) If Th, D,TE ,VE  e : T and e −→ e′, then
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Th, D,TE ,VE  e′ : T .
Lemma 2.2 (Progress) If Th, D,TE ,VE  e : T , then there does not exist a
sequence of reductions
e = e0 −→ · · · −→ en
where en does not contain any redices and is not a value.
3 Role-Based Policy Language Implementation
Our main example illustrates the general approach of bringing aspects of the policy
language outside the trusted computing base (TCB) and implementing them as
libraries. As explained in Sect. 1, part of the motivation for this approach is the
myriad possibilities for the policy language. Even if one were to ﬁx on a policy
language, there may be several possible implementation strategies associated with
it. The example in this and the following sections illustrates an end-to-end approach
based on the policy language itself being implemented outside the TCB.
General delegation has been criticized in some circles because of the expense of
credential chain discovery and of checking credential chains [38]. Cascaded delega-
tion is a more limited form of delegation that only allows credential chains to be
extended in one direction [29,37]. Cascaded delegation was explicitly developed for
delegation in distributed systems. Role-based cascaded delegation (RBCD) synthe-
sizes role-based access control and cascaded delegation [38].
Two implementation strategies have been proposed for RBCD:
(i) The simple naive approach uses credential chains and a conventional signing
algorithm such as RSA or DSA [15,34].
(ii) Motivated by the cost of credential checking with the naive approach, an al-
ternative approach is to use the algorithms for hierarchical certiﬁcate-based
encryption (HCBE) for signing credential chains [16]. Rather than continually
recheck credential chains, this approach allows a chain of signed credentials to
be merged (aggregated) into a single credential [38].
It should be emphasized that our approach is completely agnostic on the issue
of whether the HCBE approach is in fact faster than the naive RSA approach.
The point here is to show how the approach to incorporating policy languages
into language-based security can accomodate diﬀerent languages with alternative
implementation strategies.
In what follows, we distill the essence of RBCD, RSA and HCBE into simple
functional operations. We refer to the language with the CascDel ADT as the
source level, and the language into which it is translated as the target level.
4 Role-Based Cascaded Delegation
Fig. 5 provides the speciﬁcation for the policy language for RBCD. In keeping with
the formal system outlined in Sect. 2, a theory signature consists of some collection
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predicate A.r
ap
=⇒ D
predicate D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r
predicate D0.priv
dp
=⇒ D
rule authorize : (D0 says D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r) → (A says A.r ap=⇒ D) → (D0 says D0.priv dp=⇒ D)
rule delegate : (D0 says D0.priv
dp
=⇒ D) → (D says D0.priv ar=⇒ A.r) → (D0 says D0.priv ar=⇒ A.r)
type CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r)
INITIATE : (SimpleCert(D0, (D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A1.r1)))
→ CascDel(D0.priv ar=⇒ A1.r1)
EXTEND : CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A1.r1)
→ (SimpleCert(A1, (A1.r1 ap=⇒ D)))
→ SimpleCert(D , (D0.priv ar=⇒ A2.r2))
→ CascDel(D0.priv ar=⇒ A2.r2)
SAY : CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r)
→ (SimpleCert(A, (A.r ap=⇒ D)))
→ (D0 says (D0.priv ap=⇒ D))
sayCert : SimpleCert(D,F ) → (D says F )
SAY (INITIATE(c), rc) = authorize(sayCert(c), sayCert(rc))
SAY (EXTEND(ch, rc, c), rc0) = authorize(delegate(SAY (ch, rc), sayCert(c)), sayCert(rc0))
Fig. 5. Signatures of RBCD Operations
of predicates {t : K ⇒ Prop}, speciﬁed by predicate clauses in the policy language
speciﬁcation. We deﬁne the predicates in the example languuage as inﬁx construc-
tors, since that is how they are normally depicted in the literature. There are sev-
eral access predicates deﬁned: A.r
ap
=⇒ D for role membership, D0.priv ar=⇒ A.r for
granting a privilege D0.priv (controlled by D0) to the role A.r, and D0.priv
dp
=⇒ D
for granting a privilege to the principal D.
There is also some collection of inference rule constructors {c :
∀t : K.T → rep F}, speciﬁed by rule clauses in the policy language speciﬁcation.
There are two rules for chaining credentials (in cleartext):
(i) authorize grants a privilege to a principal based on a role membership certiﬁ-
cate.
(ii) delegate delegates a privilege to a role by a principal that has already obtained
that privilege.
The authorize and delegate rules rely on static compile-time credential checking
based on type-checking. The correctness of the credentials built using these rules
is based on the types of the arguments, which are unsigned cleartext. Credentials
based on these rules are amenable to forgery and tampering when transmitted
across address spaces. So there should be some way to build credential chains,
using cryptographic signing, that prevents these forms of attacks.
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type Signed(F )
sign : PrivateKey(D) → (D says F ) → Signed(F )
auth : PublicKey(D) → Signed(F ) → (D says F )
auth(k+, sign(k−, v)) = v
Fig. 6. RSA Signing and Authentication
datatype SimpleCert(D,F )
with scert : (D says F ) → Signed(F ) → SimpleCert(D,F )
// Derived operations
makeCert : (D says F ) → PrivateKey(D) → SimpleCert(D,F )
authCert : Signed(F ) → PublicKey(D) → SimpleCert(D,F )
sayCert : SimpleCert(D,F ) → D says F
getCert : SimpleCert(D,F ) → Signed(F )
makeCert = λc. λk. scert(c, sign(k, c))
authCert = λcphtxt . λk. let clrtxt = auth(k, cphtxt) in scert(clrtxt , cphtxt)
sayCert = λsc. case sc of scert(clrtxt , ) ⇒ clrtxt
getCert = λsc. case sc of scert( , cphtxt) ⇒ cphtxt
Fig. 7. Simple Certiﬁcates
The CascDel abstract data type is a speciﬁcation for credential chains that
include ciphertext. This type is parameterized by four arguments, so we write it
as CascDel(D0.priv
ar=⇒ A.r): it speciﬁes a credential chain that demonstrates the
grant of access to D0.priv to principals in the role A.r. There are three operations
for this ADT:
(i) INITIATE initiates a credential chain based on the inital grant of the privilege
to a role.
(ii) EXTEND extends such a credential chain, based on a principal in the granted
role delegating the privilege to another role.
(iii) SAY uses the credential chain, and a role membership certiﬁcate for the
granted role, to generate a proof that a principal has been granted the privilege.
These operations take credentials as arguments. Providing cleartext credentials
of type D says F is insuﬃcient: the combined credentials will typically be bundled up
and retransmitted across unsafe networks, and the digital signatures for the original
credentials from which the cleartext credentials are derived must be included in
this bundling. Therefore instead of cleartext credentials of type D says F , we use
combined cleartext and ciphertext credentials of type SimpleCert(D,F ). A value
of such a type is a pair of a ciphertext credential (with the signing principal elided)
and the underlying cleartext credential (with the signing principal D made explicit
in the type). It is straightforward to map between ciphertext credentials and these
credential pairs during marshalling and unmarshalling.
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datatype Chain(D0.priv , A1.r1
dr
=⇒ A2.r2)
with emptyChain : Chain(D0.priv , A.r
dr
=⇒ A.r)
and simpleChain : SimpleCert(A1, A1.r1
ap
=⇒ D)
→ SimpleCert(D,D0.priv ar=⇒ A2.r2)
→ Chain(D0.priv , A1.r1 dr=⇒ A2.r2)
and combineChain : Chain(D0.priv , A1.r1
dr
=⇒ A.r)
→ Chain(D0.priv , A.r dr=⇒ A2.r2)
→ Chain(D0.priv , A1.r1 dr=⇒ A2.r2)
Fig. 8. Chains of Role Delegations
datatype RBCD(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r)
with rbcd : SimpleCert(D0,D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A0.r0)
→ Chain(D0.priv ,A0.r0 dr=⇒ A.r)
→ RBCD(D0.priv ar=⇒ A.r)
[[CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r)]] = RBCD(D0.priv ar=⇒ A.r)
[[INITIATE ]] = λc : (SimpleCert(D0, (D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A1.r1))).
rbcd(c, emptyChain)
[[EXTEND ]] = λch : [[CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A1.r1)]].
λrc : (SimpleCert(A1, (A1.r1
ap
=⇒ D))).
λc : SimpleCert(D , (D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A2.r2)).
case ch of rbcd(cert , chain) ⇒
rbcd(cert , combineChain(chain, simpleChain(rc, c)))
[[SAY ]] = λch : [[CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r)]].
λrc : (SimpleCert(A, (A.r
ap
=⇒ D))).
authorize(loop(ch), rc)
where loop = λch : [[CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r)]].
case ch of rbcd(cert , chain) ⇒ loop0 (sayCert(cert), chain)
and loop0 = λcert : (D0 says D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A0.r0).
λchain : Chain(D0.priv ,A0.r0
dr
=⇒ A.r)
case chain of
emptyChain ⇒ cert
| simpleChain(rc0, c0) ⇒ delegate(authorize(cert ,
sayCert(rc0)),
sayCert(c0))
| combineChain(chn1, chn2) ⇒ let cert0 = loop0 (cert , chn1) in
loop(cert0, chn2)
Fig. 9. Translation of RBCD to Chained Delegation
5 Implementation in RSA
Fig. 6 gives the operations for RSA digital signing. The signing operation elides
the identity of the principal making a statement F , and authentication re-exposes
this principal identity after a runtime cryptographic check. The signing operation
maps from a cleartext credential to the ciphertext equivalent, and the authentication
operation is a checked operation for mapping back again. The notations k+ and k−
denote the public and private parts, respectively, of a public-private key pair.
Fig. 7 gives the speciﬁcation for simple certiﬁcates, that bundle a ciphertext
credential and its cleartext credential together as a pair. The makeCert operation is
used by the originator of a cleartext credential to generate the ciphertext equivalent,
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using his or her private signing key. The authCert operation is used by receivers of
ciphertext credentials to pair them with their cleartext equivalents, using signature
authentication. Finally sayCert and getCert extract the cleartext and ciphertext
parts, respectively, of a simple certiﬁcate.
The RSA implementation of RBCD uses chains of digitally signed credentials.
The Chain datatype is used to implement these chains. In general such a chain of
credentials denotes the delegation of access rights (for privilege D0.priv) from role
A1.r1 to role A2.r2, therefore we denote it as Chain(D0.priv , A1.r1
dr=⇒ A2.r2).
Fig. 9 provides the implementation of RBCD using chained credentials signed
using RSA. The credentials are represented as a pair of the credential granting
initial access to a role A0.r0, and thereafter a chain of delegations to some role
A.r. There is an implicit use of existential types to elide the intermediate role
A0.r0 in the type. The INITIATE operation creates an empty chain, the EXTEND
operation extends the chain by one more role, and the SAY operation recurses over
the resulting chain to build a cleartext credential using the inference rules of the
access control logic. There is no digital signature checking during the operation of
SAY ; it is assumed that this will have been done using unmarshalling, creating a
pair of type SimpleCert(D,F ) from a marshalled credential of type Signed(F ) using
an authentication key of PublicKey(D).
With the addition of (RSA) cryptographic operations, we must allow for stuck
computation due to failure of authentication:
Theorem 5.1 (Modiﬁed Progress) If Th, D,TE ,VE  e : T , then there does
not exist a sequence of reductions
e = e0 −→ · · · −→ en
where en does not contain any redices and is not a value, or en has the form
E[auth(k+1 , sign(k
−
2 , v))], where k1 = k2.
As noted, this does not aﬀect the implementations of the RBCD operations,
since they do not perform authentication. Authentication is performed in the pro-
cess of unmarshalling signed certiﬁcates and building simple certiﬁcates. If simple
certiﬁcate formation is restricted to the makeCert (make a new simple certiﬁcate)
and authCert (build a new simple certiﬁcate from ciphertext) operations, then au-
thentication failures are isolated to the latter.
We verify the following by induction on the original type derivation:
Theorem 5.2 (Type Preservation) If Th, D,TE ,VE  e : T at the source level,
then Th, D,TE , [[VE ]]  [[e]] : [[T ]] at the target level.
The following result is a simple veriﬁcation based on the size of the input to the
loop0 function in the deﬁnition of [[SAY ]]:
Theorem 5.3 (Termination) The translations of the INITIATE, EXTEND and
SAY operations are guaranteed to terminate on all arguments.
This ensures that the result of the SAY operation is a well-formed certiﬁcate
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type HSigned(F )
hsign : HPrivateKey(D0) → (D0 says F ) → HSigned(F )
hauth : HPublicKey(D0) → HSigned(F ) → (D0 says F )
[ ]− : PrivateKey(D) → HPrivateKey(D)
[ ]+ : PublicKey(D) → HPublicKey(D)
@− : HPrivateKey(D1) → HPrivateKey(D2) → HPrivateKey(D1)
@+ : HPublicKey(D1) → HPublicKey(D2) → HPublicKey(D1)
haggregate : SimpleCert(D1, F1)
→ SimpleCert(D2, F2)
→ ((D1 says F1) → (D2 says F2) → (D1 says F ))
→ SimpleCert(D1, F )
datatype SimpleCert(D,F ) with hcert : (D says F ) → HSigned(F ) → SimpleCert(D,F )
hauth([k+1 , . . . , k
+
n ]
+, hsign([k−1 , . . . , k
−
n ]
−, v)) = v
haggregate(hcert(hsign(k1, c1), c′1), hcert(hsign(k2, c2), c
′
2), p)
= hcert(hsign((k1@−k2), p(c1, c2)), p(c′1, c
′
2))
// Derived operations
makeHCert : (D says F ) → HPrivateKey(D) → SimpleCert(D,F )
authHCert : HSigned(F ) → HPublicKey(D) → SimpleCert(D,F )
sayHCert : SimpleCert(D,F ) → D says F
getHCert : SimpleCert(D,F ) → HSigned(F )
Fig. 10. HCBE Signing, Authentication and Aggregation
[[CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r)]] = SimpleCert(D0, D0.priv ar=⇒ A.r)
INITIATE = λc : (SimpleCert(D0, (D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A1.r1))). c
EXTEND = λch : [[CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A1.r1)]].
λrc : (SimpleCert(A1, (A1.r1
ap
=⇒ D))).
λc : SimpleCert(D , (D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A2.r2)).
haggregate(haggregate(ch, rc, authorize), c, delegate)
SAY = λch : [[CascDel(D0.priv
ar
=⇒ A.r)]].
λrc : (SimpleCert(A, (A.r
ap
=⇒ D))).
haggregate(ch, rc, authorize)
Fig. 11. Translation of RBCD to HCBE
validating the policy language statement, constructed using the inference rules of
the policy language logic.
We verify the following by induction on the size of the credentials chain con-
structed using the EXTEND operation:
Theorem 5.4 The equations of the CascDel ADT are satisﬁed by its implementa-
tion in RSA.
6 Implementation Using HCBE
Fig. 10 provides operations based on HCBE for signing. The algorithms for digital
signing now are diﬀerent and therefore the implementation of simple certiﬁcates
SimpleCert(D,F ) is also diﬀerent. The distinguishing feature of these signing algo-
rithms is the haggregate operation that aggregates or merges two signed credentials
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into one. We deﬁne this aggregation operation for simple certiﬁcates (pairs of clear-
text and ciphertext credentials), rather than just ciphertext credentials, in order to
continue doing well-formedness checks on the underlying cleartext credential with-
out having to digitally authenticate. The aggregation operation takes as its third
argument an inference rule for combining the underlying cleartext credentials when
ciphertext credentials are merged.
The new concept introduced by the HCBE operations is that of combined sign-
ing and authentication keys. The aggregation operation of HCBE builds a new
ciphertext, from two signed ciphertexts, by signing the underlying cleartexts with
the combination of the original private signing keys. The combination of the cor-
responding public keys is then used to authenticate. An advantage of the HCBE
approach over the RSA approach is that the identities of the signing principals,
beyond the ﬁrst principal in the chain, does not need to be revealed, thus providing
some notion of privacy in credential chain checking. We represent key combination
using operations for injecting simple keys into compound keys ( [ ]− and [ ]+ for
private and public keys, respectively), as well as operations for combining compound
keys ( @− and @+ for private and public keys, respectively). The types of these
operations reﬂect the fact that only the identity of the ﬁrst signing principal in a
chain is revealed by the signatures resulting from these compound keys. We assume
the combination operations @− and @+ are left-associative and abbreviate:
[k−1 , . . . , k
−
n ]
−≡ [k−1 ]−@+ · · ·@+[k−n ]−
[k+1 , . . . , k
+
n ]
+≡ [k+1 ]+@+ · · ·@+[k+n ]+
These signing operations are used in Fig. 11 to implement the operations of
RBCD. Unlike the RSA implementation, there is no longer any use of credential
chains and hence no need for a recursive algorithm to verify a digital credential
chain. Instead the aggregation operation of HCBE is used to combine credentials,
during the EXTEND operation and during the SAY operation (combining the last
role membership credential with the aggregated credential chain).
Theorem 6.1 (Modiﬁed Progress) If Th, D,TE ,VE  e : T , then there does
not exist a sequence of reductions
e = e0 −→ · · · −→ en
where en does not contain any redices and is not a value, or en has the form
E[hauth(k+1 , hsign(k
−
2 , v))], where k1 and k2 are compound keys, and k1 = k2.
As before, verify the following by induction on the original type derivation:
Theorem 6.2 (Type Preservation) If Th, D,TE ,VE  e : T at the source level,
then Th, D,TE , [[VE ]]  [[e]] : [[T ]] at the target level.
Theorem 6.3 (Termination) The translations of the INITIATE, EXTEND and
SAY operations are guaranteed to terminate on all arguments.
The veriﬁcation of the following requires induction on the size of the compound
keys in the haggregate operation that is the underlying representation for a RBCD
certiﬁcate in HCBE:
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Theorem 6.4 The equations of the CascDel ADT are satisﬁed by its implementa-
tion in RSA.
7 Relating to Language-Based Information Flow Con-
trol
In Sect. 2 we discussed the issue of how to generate primitive policy language state-
ments, of the form P says F , while ensuring the integrity of the statement. Simply
creating a data structure of representation type rep (P says F ) is obviously insuﬃ-
cient. The approach mentioned in Sect. 2, similar to the approach of proof-carrying
authentication, relies on private signing keys for principals to generate these state-
ments. In this section we consider another approach, related to integrity-checking
in language-based security.
The JIF language [26,25,28] demonstrates an approach to access-checking and
information ﬂow control checking in a programming language type system. In ad-
dition to types, program variables have labels that control (read and write) access
to those variables. A label is a set of policies. A policy is essentially an access con-
trol list, written {A : {B1, . . . , Bm}} allowing access to principals B1, . . . , Bm. The
principal A has control of the policy, in the sense that A may declassify information
protected by that policy. JIF allows several distinct security policies to be deﬁned
for a program variable, in order to support secure information sharing: Diﬀerent
principals may have independent control on the sharing of information stored in a
program variable. In general a program variable has a labelled type
TL1,L2
where L1 is a secrecy label, restricting the principals that may read from that
variable, while L2 is an integrity label, restricting the principals that may write to
that variable.
In proof-carrying authentication, higher-order logic is used as a metalanguage
for policy languages. In an object language with the say predicate, there is a rule
that allows logical conclusions to be derived from signed statements:
for all principals P, (P signed F) ⇒ (P says F)
where F is a formula in logic. As an alternative, in a language such as JIF with
labelled types (or any kind of integrity constraints encoded in the type system), we
can specify the following rule in the speciﬁcation of the theory for a policy language:
∀L.∀A.∀B.(rep FL,{A:{B}} → (B says F )L,{A:{B}}.
The integrity constraint in the labelled type ensures that this is a valid primitive
statement in the policy language. Unlike the aforesaid approaches, it does not rely
on cryptographic libraries. Therefore expensive cryptographic signing operations,
and some assumptions about key management, are avoided for credential creation
and manipulation as long as the credentials stay within a process address space.
Going one step further, we may treat P says F as an abbreviation:
P says F ≡ (rep F ){},{P :{P}}.
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So a primitive policy language statement F corresponds to a value-level represen-
tation for that formula, with integrity checking that the term was generated by (on
behalf of) the corresponding principal.
Now we can go one step further and generalize this abbreviation to:
L says F ≡ (rep F ){},L.
In this case we generalize the notion of who expresses a policy language statement
completely, from some primitive notion of the principal that generated the state-
ment, to a more general notion of any principals allowed to make that statement
according to the integrity policy speciﬁed by the security label L.
Labels and policies still rely on some notion of principals, at least in the JIF
framework. However alternatives may be explored where the form of policies is
generalized from ACLs, and where principals then become derived concepts (derived
from the access policies). This is an interesting line of further work that we are
currently pursuing.
8 Related Work
The motivation for this work has been the need for proper programming abstractions
for developing applications that must manage some or all of the task of securing
their communication in a network environment. Abadi [1] considers a type system
for ensuring that secrecy is preserved in security protocols implemented in that
type system. Gordon and Jeﬀrey [18,19] have developed a type-based approach to
verifying authentication protocols. Abadi and Blanchet [2,6] pursue an approach to
analyzing security protocols, initially for secrecy properties but later generalizing
it to integrity properties. All of these works are focused on verifying secrecy and
integrity properties of security protocols. As such the type systems that they use
are far more sophisticated than the average programmer will use, while at the same
time they give very strong guarantees of secrecy and integrity. The focus of our work
is not protocol veriﬁcation, but building accountable systems: engineering a system
where accesses can be logged, but doing it in such a way that the performance of
the system is not killed by the demands of credentials checking. So for example we
make no attempt to cope with replay attacks.
Other work on security in programming languages has focused on ensuring safety
properties of untrusted code [31,30,24] and preventing unwanted security ﬂows in
programs [13,27,42,33]. Sabelfeld and Myers [35] provide an excellent overview of
work in language-based information-ﬂow security.
As already mentioned, this work essentially combines two strands of work:
(i) Type-based cryptographic APIs that relate cryptographic operations to the
security policies that they are intended to enforce [14].
(ii) Frameworks for encoding policy languages (signatures and credential formation
rules) so that particular policy languages are placed outside of the TCB [3,5].
Appel, Baujer and Felten’s proof-carrying authentication uses higher-order logic
to encode the inference rules of policy languages, basing the consistency of the latter
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on the consistency of the former. Our approach instead is closer to the LF approach
of deﬁning policy languages as abstract data types in a theory signature, rather
than as encodings in HOL. The system can be viewed as a dependent type system,
where types may depend on values. Our approach maintains a “phase distinction”
between values and types, so that types do not depend on values, relying on type-
level names for value-level entities (e.g., principals), and singleton types that relate
the two. Part of the motivation for this is that, for purposes that go beyond the
current account [10], it is useful to have some notion of deﬁned equality at the type
level (equating principal names, for example), and for this it appears preferable to
keep the levels distinct.
As discussed, we are interested in relating this approach to type-based ap-
proaches to enforcing security policies, such as for example the decentralized la-
bel model of the JIF language [26,25,28]. Distributed versions of JIF have been
implemented. The J/Split system [43] partitions a sequential JIF program into a
distributed system, where portions of the program run on hosts that are trusted
for the principals for whom the code runs. For two mutually distrustful principals
engaged in a distributed game, a trusted third party (the board) is responsible for
communicating data from one party to the other. Network security (cryptographic
operations) is implicitly part of the TCB. Chothia et al [9] introduce Key-Based
Decentralized Label Model (KDLM), which combines the idea of typed-based cryp-
tographic APIs expressing security properties, with many of the ideas of the JIF
type system. However they only consider a policy language involving ACLs. Tse
and Zdancewic [40,39] consider a language based on certiﬁcate-based declassiﬁca-
tion. This is essentially a variation of the JIF policy language (based on ACLs and
delegation of principal rights): rather than deﬁning a policy as an ACL, it is deﬁned
by a set of certiﬁcates given out for that policy that grant access to principals. Al-
though they report that their ﬁrst-class principals can be mapped down to PKI, it
appears that network security remains part of the language runtime. They provide
a monadic semantics that allows them to reason modularly about non-interference
for various extensions of the language.
9 Conclusions
We have described an approach for building distributed implementations of pol-
icy languages over untrusted networks, building on trusted cryptographic libraries
and using the language type system to carry correctness guarantees through the
implementation. At the same time, we have deliberately omitted aspects of the
implementations, for the purpose of simplifying the exposition. We deliberately
treat the cryptographic operations as black boxes and do not consider attacks
based on exploiting properties of the algorithms. So this approach is very much
based on Dolev-Yao assumptions about the algorithms. Additionally we do not
consider network attacks based on protocol weaknesses, for example, exploiting at-
tacks based on repeated uses of nonces. There has been a great deal of good work on
type-based approaches to security protocol veriﬁcation [18,19], essentially deﬁning
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domain-speciﬁc languages in which it is impossible to implement incorrect proto-
cols. These approaches make explicit notions of nonces, with type systems that
prevent their repeated use and track correspondence assertions to verify aspects of
the protocols. It appears to be plausible that our approach can be combined with
these other approaches, at the cost of some increase in complexity (primarily the
addition of eﬀect types). The main conceptual overhead in this approach is a ubiq-
uitious use of parameterized types to model security policies in the type system.
Since there is successful experience with the use of genericity in ML, Haskell, Ada,
increasingly Java generics and to some extent C++ templates, we are conﬁdent are
our approach could be adopted by reasonably competent software developers. We
are in the process of implementing this approach to test this assertion.
An obvious question that arises, is how the correctness of the implementations
relates to security guarantees in programs that use these library implementations.
The implementation correctness guarantees well-formed certiﬁcates in the policy
language for a particular application. Our approach is to relate these to statements
to information ﬂow guarantees based on a security type system, as alluded to in
Sect. 7. The trustworthiness of the statements then justiﬁes some modiﬁcations
to the standard notions of non-interference underlying information ﬂow control We
intend to report further on this in a subsequent article.
The equational speciﬁcations are relatively simple and can be implemented as
rewrite systems in environments such as ASF, ELAN and Maude [41,8,11]. However
encoding the implementations in these environments should not miss an important
part of the encoding, the typing that ensures that “cleartext” credentials are well-
formed. A more interesting use of a rewriting environment would be to augment the
equational speciﬁcations of cryptographic operations with speciﬁcations of security
protocols, for example for key exchange. This would yield stronger security prop-
erties for policy language implementations than we consider in this paper. This is
an interesting avenue that we intend to pursue for future work.
Another issue is generalizing the forms of speciﬁcations of these abstract data
types, to include not only the semantics of the cryptographic operations but also
the semantics of protocols in which these operations are used. This appears to be
a potentially fruitful application of on-going research in rewriting-based techniques
for reasoning about security policies.
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